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The ongoing transposition of the EU Information Society Directive’s requirement that 
member States adopt of legal prohibitions of the circumvention of technological protections of 
works of authorship occasions this review of international obligations and their implementation in 
the US.   This article addresses the scope of international obligations the WIPO Copyright 
Treaties impose on member States to protect against circumvention, as well as the US experience 
with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s prohibitions on circumvention of access and copy 
controls.  It examines the text of the statute, codified at sec. 1201 of the 1976 Copyright Act, the 
five years of judicial decisions interpreting the statute, and the two administrative proceedings 
implementing one aspect of the statutory scheme.  The analysis of the DMCA and its judicial and 
administrative interpretation will take up three issues:  
 
1) What technological measures does sec. 1201 protect?  
2) What conduct does sec. 1201 prohibit? 
3) To what extent does sec. 1201 accommodate copyright exceptions? 
 
The US experience to date indicates that legal protection for technological measures has 
helped foster new business models that make works available to the public at a variety of price 
points and enjoyment options, without engendering the “digital lockup” and other copyright 
owner abuses that many had feared.  This is not to say that the US legislation and its judicial 
interpretation represent the most preferable means to making the internet a hospitable place for 
authors while continuing to enable lawful user conduct.  But brooding forecasts and legitimate 






The ongoing (belated) transposition of the EU Information Society Directive’s 
requirement that member States adopt of legal prohibitions of the circumvention of 
technological protections of works of authorship1 has made this topic both current and 
contentious.   This article wades into that rhetorically-charged fray in two different, but, I 
hope, analytically rigorous, ways.  First, following some general observations concerning 
the impetus for copyright holder resort to technological protection measures, I will 
consider the scope of international obligations the WIPO Copyright Treaties impose on 
member States to protect against circumvention.  Second, I will address the US 
experience with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s prohibitions on circumvention of 
                                                 
* Morton L Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University School of law; 
visiting Goodhart Chair of Legal Science, University of Cambridge.  This article is based on a lecture given 
at the University of Oslo Faculty of Law, May 18, 2005. 
1 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Official Journal 
L 167 , 22/06/2001 P. 0010 - 0019.  Article 6 addresses technological protection measures; article 13(1) 
required member States to have implemented the Directive’s norms by Dec 22, 2002.   
access and copy controls.  I will consider the text of the statute, codified at sec. 1201 of 
the 1976 Copyright Act, the five years of judicial decisions interpreting the statute, and 
the two administrative proceedings implementing one aspect of the statutory scheme.  
The analysis of the DMCA and its judicial and administrative interpretation will take up 
three issues:  
 
1) What technological measures does sec. 1201 protect?  
2) What conduct does sec. 1201 prohibit? 
3) To what extent does sec. 1201 accommodate copyright exceptions? 
 
By examining one national system where legal protections for technological 
measures have been in place for some time, I hope to contribute modestly toward the 
discussions in Europe concerning the implementation of the EU and WIPO Treaties’ 
directive to provide adequate legal protection against the circumvention of effective 
technological measures.2  The US experience to date indicates that legal protection for 
technological measures has helped foster new business models that make works available 
to the public at a variety of price points and enjoyment options, without engendering the 
“digital lockup” and other copyright owner abuses that many had feared.3  This is not to 
say that the US legislation and its judicial interpretation have found the magic formula for 
making the internet a hospitable place for authors while continuing to enable lawful user 
conduct.  But brooding forecasts and legitimate continuing concerns notwithstanding, the 
overall equilibrium so far appears to be a reasonable one. 
 
 Let me turn to the general policy question: Why establish an international 
obligation requiring legal protection for technological protections of copyrighted works?  
As many commentators and other authorities have recognized, in the digital environment, 
the ease of copying may render legal protection simpliciter inadequate.4  In the past, 
copying technology was too rudimentary, cumbersome or expensive to enable users to 
                                                 
2 See WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 11; WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty art. 18; Information 
Society Directive, supra, art. 6. 
3 On fear and loathing of legal protection for technological measures, see, e.g., Jonathan Band & Taro 
Isshiki, The New Anti-Circumvention Provision in the Copyright Act: A Flawed First Step, CYBERSPACE 
LAW, Feb. 1999, at 2; Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999); Jessica Litman, The 
Breadth of the Anti-Trafficking Provisions and the Moral High Ground, in ADJUNCTS AND ALTERNATIVES 
TO COPYRIGHT:  PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALAI CONGRESS JUNE 13-17, 2001 456 (Jane C. Ginsburg & June 
M. Besek eds., 2002); Kamiel Koelman, The Protection of Technological Measures vs. the Copyright 
Limitations, in ADJUNCTS AND ALTERNATIVES at 448; Thomas C. Vinje, A Brave New World of Technical 
Protection Systems:  Will There Still Be Room for Copyright?, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 431 (1996). 
4 See, e.g., US Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights of the Task Force on the National 
Information Infrastructure WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INFORMATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE 230 (1995); Jörg Reinbothe and Silke von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties 1996 135-37 
(2002); Mihàly Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet: The 1996 WIPO Treaties, Their 
Interpretation and Implementation, 359-406 (2002); Séverine Dusollier, Droit d'auteur et protection des 
oeuvres dans l'univers numérique - Droits et exceptions à la lumière des dispositifs de verrouillage des 
oeuvres [page cite] (2005). 
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copy and redisseminate on the scale that digital media make possible.5  Copyright law’s 
prohibitions thus generally sufficed, because right holders could enforce the law against 
the commercial intermediaries who engaged in large scale copying and dissemination, 
while whatever copying end users engaged in was unlikely to rival the copyright owner’s 
control of markets for the work.  When digital media changed the technological balance, 
they also altered legal relationships, for now economically significant infringing acts 
were no longer the sole province of entities higher up the distribution chain.  To redress 
the shift, it might be necessary to reinforce the legal prohibition with a layer of 
technological protection, disabling end users from availing themselves of some of the 
copying technology’s potential for reproducing and redistributing copyrighted works.  
  
But supplying a technological lock may offer only short-lived solace: the measure 
may be effective only for so long as it takes to develop and distribute a device to break it. 
If end users may easily procure the means to circumvent technological impediments, then 
we are back where we started, without a middleman against whom copyright may 
effectively be enforced.  Hence the conclusion followed that legal protection 
supplemented by technological protection will fail unless the technological protection is 
in turn backed up by further legal protection against the provision of circumvention 
devices or services.6  When the copyists are so diffuse, the intermediary whom the 
enforcement efforts target now becomes the distributor of the means to circumvent 
technological protections. 
 
 The mandates of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaties stem from this recognition.  
Moreover, the drafters of the WCT and WPPT were not writing on an entirely clean slate, 
for WIPO had itself previously considered proposing dispositions prohibiting the 
distribution of “unauthorized decoders” of encrypted television transmissions.7  In 
addition, the European Commission had in 1991 already required member States to 
prohibit “any act of putting into circulation, or the possession for commercial purposes 
of, any means the sole intended purpose of which is to facilitate the unauthorized removal 
or circumvention of any technical device which may have been applied to protect a 
                                                 
5See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 217, 224-25 
(discussing “state of the art” limitations on unauthorized copying and exploitation).   
6 For an evocation and analysis of this three-layer approach, see, e.g., Alain Strowel., La protection des 
mesures techniques: une couche en trop?, Auteurs & Médias, 2001, p. 90-95.  Séverine Dusollier, Droit 
d'auteur et protection des oeuvres dans l'univers numérique - Droits et exceptions à la lumière des 
dispositifs de verrouillage des oeuvres (2005).  As Professor Sirinelli has observed, “Technology comes to 
the aid of rights threatened by technology.  But can it do everything?  In order to be really effective, the 
devices themselves have to be protected.  The WIPO Treaties . . . provide such measures.  In a never-
ending game of mirrors, rights come to the aid of technology so as to allow the latter to come to the aid of 
rights ….!!!”  Pierre Sirinelli, Exceptions and limitations to copyright and neighboring rights, Report 
presented to the Workshop on Implementation Issues of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO 
Performers and Phonograms (WPPT), Geneva, December 6-7, 1999, WIPO Doc. WCT-WPPT/IMP/1 p. 
28 (Dec. 3, 1999). 
7 See Committee of Experts on Model Provisions in the Field of Copyright, Third Session (Geneva, July 2-
13, 1990) Copyright  September 1990, Preparatory Document, at para. 319-38.  The Committee of Experts 
also considered requiring the provision of equipment that would limit the ability of home recording 
machines to make successive generations of digital copies, see id., para. 303-17.  The proposal would have 
included an early form of copyright management information, see para. 312. 
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computer program.”8  Similarly, in 1992, the US Audio Home Recording Act required all 
“digital audio recording devices” to be equipped with the “serial copying management 
system,” which disabled multigenerational copying of digital musical recordings.  The 
Act also prohibited the distribution of any device or provision of any service “the primary 
purpose or effect of which is to . . . circumvent” the system.9   More generally, many 
national laws contained a variety of provisions in their tort or unfair competition laws, as 
well as in their telecommunication and penal laws, prohibiting a range of circumvention-
related conduct such as the sale of satellite descramblers, and computer hacking.10
 
I. Subject matter and scope of the international obligation
 
Article 11 of the WCT provides: 
 
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the 
circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise 
of their rights under this treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, 
which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law. 
   
We will consider the subject matter as well as the scope of protection that the WCT 
requires member States to provide.11  
  
Subject matter protected – “effective technological measures”:  The WCT does not 
define what makes a technological protection measure “effective.”  The term, which 
recurs in national and regional laws implementing art. 11,12 is not self-explanatory.13  The 
one thing it cannot mean is “impervious.”  That is, were the measure not “effective” 
unless it resisted attempts to circumvent it, there would be no need for legal protection; 
the technology would take care of itself.  If “effective” simply means that it hinders or 
prevents the relevant copyright-implicating act14 -- copying, distributing, communicating 
                                                 
8 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs (91/250/EEC) 
Official Journal L 122, 17/05/1991 P. 0042 - 0046, art. 7(1)(c). 
9 17 U.S.C. § 1002(c). 
10 For a detailed discussion, see Séverine Dusollier, General Report, Situating Legal Protections for 
Copyright-Related Technological Measures in the Broader Legal Landscape: Anti Circumvention 
Protection outside Copyright, in Adjuncts and Alternatives to Copyright, Proceedings of the 2001 ALAI 
Congress, 123 (Jane Ginsburg and June Besek, eds. 2002) [hereafter Adjuncts and Alternatives].  See also 
the questionnaire related to the General Report, id. at 110.  
11 The following analysis of WCT art 11 is adapted from SAM RICKETSON AND JANE C. GINSBURG, 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND paras. 
15.10-15.22 ( forthcoming, Oxford U. Press 2006). 
12 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. sec. 1201(a)(1)(A), 1201(b)(1)(A); Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights 
in the information society, Official Journal L 167 , 22/06/2001, art. 6 
13 For a variety of interpretations, see Jacques de Werra, The Legal System of Technological Protection 
Measures under the WIPO Treaties, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the European Union Directives, 
and other National Laws, (Japan, Australia), in Adjuncts and Alternatives 198, 207. 
14 See,.e.g, 17 U.S.C. sec. 1201(b)(2)(B) (“a technological measure ‘effectively protects a right of a 
copyright owner under this title’ if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, 
or otherwise limits the exercise of a right of a copyright owner under this title). 
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to the public – then it is not clear what the term adds.15  By contrast, the approach taken 
in the European Union defines the term to describe the universe of protected measures: in 
the EU, an “effective” technological measure is one “where the use of a protected work 
or other subject-matter is controlled by the rightholders through application of an access 
control or protection process, such as encryption, scrambling or other transformation of 
the work or other subject-matter or a copy control mechanism, which achieves the 
protection objective.”16  This definition resolves the question of coverage of types of 
technological measures.  It implies, however, that a technological measure that controls 
neither access nor copying, would not be “effective” (no matter how well it functioned), 
and therefore would not be protected against circumvention.17  
 
 “Used by authors . . .”  In this context, the term “authors” comprehends authors’ 
successors in title (see Berne. Conv. art. 2(6)).  While authors themselves may 
increasingly apply technological protection measures that enable them to market their 
works directly to the public without resort to intermediaries who require them to transfer 
all or part of their copyrights,18 the WCT text should not be read to limit the protection of 
technological measures only to those actually applied by authors.  Such a reading would 
disqualify protection of devices used by intermediaries on behalf of authors, thus 
defeating the WCT’s author-protective goals.  Moreover, the difficulty of knowing 
whether a particular protection measure has been used by the author or by her successor 
in title would make such an interpretation unworkable.   
 
 “. . .in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne 
Convention”:  This phrase concerns the types of technological protection measures 
covered.  A measure that prevents or hinders any of the acts covered within Berne or 
WCT economic or moral rights with respect to protected works would come within art. 
11’s scope.  Thus, measures protecting against copying (Berne Conv. art. 9), adapting 
                                                 
15 Reinbothe and von Lewinski, supra at 145, suggest that malfunctioning technological measures need not 
be protected against circumvention, nor should those which “interfere with the normal functioning of the 
equipment or services,” giving the example of a copy control mechanism that interferes with the playability 
of a television or VCR. 
Perhaps a technological measure is not “effective,” even if it functions properly, if access may be gained by 
means other than circumventing the device, that is, if the access device controls one “door” to a work, but 
another “door” exists and is not technologically locked, then locking only one “door” is not “effective.”  
See Lexmark Int’l. v.Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir, 2004) (employing door 
metaphor) see discussion of DMCA, infra. 
16 Information Society Directive, art. 6(3). 
17 It is not clear that such a measure in fact does or will exist.  Devices that control distribution come to 
mind, but in the digital environment, distribution (or making available) probably implies copying.  For the 
same reasons, technological measures protecting the moral right of integrity will probably be covered by 
the EU’s definition of “effective.”  By contrast, a technological measure that protects the attribution right 
might not.  Moreover such a device would not necessarily be within the scope of WCT art. 12’s protection 
for copyright management information. 
18 In the digital environment, many of the tasks publishers performed that were unrelated to the production 
and distribution of hard copies, such as promoting the works and accounting for sales, may be undertaken 
by agents or other new businesses whose compensation need not derive from owning the author’s 
copyrights.  See, e.g., Jane Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 
Colum. L. Rev. 1613, 1645-47 (2001); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: 
Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 274-275 (2002). 
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(Berne Conv. art. 12), distributing of physical copies, including by means of rental (WCT 
art. 6), publicly communicating (Berne Conv. arts. 11, 11bis, 11ter, 14, 14bis; WCT art. 
8), and against violations of the integrity and attribution rights (Berne Conv. art. 6bis) 
would all be covered.   
 But a particularly significant subset of technological protection measures addresses 
an arguably different act; these regulate access to a work of authorship.19   In the digital 
environment, works may be made available not only in traditional formats permitting 
unlimited access, but also in access-controlled formats that limit the user’s apprehension 
of the work to a certain number of viewings or hearings, or to a certain time period.  A 
technological measure shuts off access after the designated time period or number of 
consultations.  The copy of the work may remain in the user’s hard drive or on a CD Rom 
or similar external medium, but the user may be required to pay an additional fee or 
supply additional information before access will be restored.  These sorts of formats may 
be particularly appealing to users who do not need or desire unlimited viewings or 
hearings of the work, assuming that a reduction in price accompanies the reduction in 
access.  Whatever the business justifications for access controls, the question for 
interpretation of WCT art. 11 is whether it prohibits the circumvention of these measures 
as well. 
 
 Coverage of access controls: The response turns on whether access controls are 
“used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under the Treaty or the 
Berne Convention.”  We will consider, first, whether accessing a work comes within the 
Berne-WCT minimum rights.  Next, we will address whether access controls are “used . . 
. in connection with” the exercise of those rights.  In connection with the first question, it 
is important to distinguish accessing a work from accessing a copy of a work, as access 
controls generally apply to the former.  Suppose a user purchases a CD ROM containing 
a copyrighted work, such as a videogame. She has acquired a copy, the physical medium 
in which the work is embodied.  But the medium is not the work.  The work is the 
videogame; to access this, she needs to load the game into her computer or videogame 
player; when the game’s sounds are heard and the images appear on the screen, she will 
have accessed the work.  If a technological measure included on the CD Rom does not 
permit her to play her copy of the game unless, for example, she enters a password, or 
plays the game only on certain designated computers, that is a measure controlling access 
to the work. 
 
 In light of this distinction, can it be said that the Berne Convention or WCT 
establish a right to control access to a work?  The WCT introduces a right of distribution 
                                                 
19 For a description and analysis of technological protection measures, see, e.g., June Besek, Anti-
Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report From the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, 
27 Colum. J. L. & the Arts 389, 446-66 (2004) [hereafter, Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws]; Jeffrey 
Cunard, Technological Protection of Copyrighted Works and Copyright Management Systems: A Brief 
Survey of the Landscape, in Adjuncts and Alternatives 24; Jacques de Werra, supra note 25, at 200-205; 
Gillian Davies, Technical Devices as a Solution to Private Copying, in Irini Stamatudi and Paul Torremans, 
eds., Copyright in the New Digital Environment, 163, 173-78 (2000); Dean Marks and Bruce Turnbull, 
Technical Protection Measures: The Intersection of Technology, Law and Commercial Licenses, WIPO 
Workshop on Implementation Issues of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), Geneva December 6-7, 1999, WIPO Doc. WCT-WPPT/IMP/3. 
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of copies to the public, but this right addresses material (rather than electronic) copies; it 
would not extend beyond conferring a right to control access to a physical copy, rather 
than to a work.20   The WCT also synthesizes the Berne Convention’s various provisions 
on public performance into a general right of “communication to the public,” including 
by digital delivery.21  This right would appear to cover “access” to a work through online 
media; it is considerably less clear that it would also cover subsequent apprehension of a 
work once the user downloads a copy to the user’s storage medium, or once the user 
acquires a free-standing copy, such as a CD ROM.22  The subsequent acts may “perform” 
or “communicate” the works, but not in or to the public.  Neither the Berne Convention 
nor the WCT requires member States to extend exclusive rights to private performances 
or communications. 
 
Accessing a work expressed in digital form might nonetheless implicate the 
reproduction right under the Berne Convention: each apprehension of the work implies 
the creation of a temporary copy in the user’s RAM.  The reproduction right set out at 
Berne Conv. art. 9(1) extends to “any manner or form;” thus it may well cover temporary 
digital copies of this kind.  But the scope of the reproduction right proved sufficiently 
controversial at the Diplomatic Conference that produced the WCT, so that many 
signatories to the WCT may not subscribe to a characterization of the scope of the 
reproduction right that would embrace a right of access to a work. 
 
 Given the continuing uncertainty in some quarters regarding the scope of the 
reproduction right, does it follow that WCT member States are not obliged to protect 
access controls against circumvention?  Not necessarily, because one must next ask 
whether access controls are technological measures “used in connection with the 
exercise” of exclusive rights.  Here the case for WCT coverage appears stronger.  For 
example, access controls may be said to be used in connection with the exercise of the 
reproduction and communication rights, because an access-controlled copy, even if 
reproduced or communicated without authorization, will yield its copyist or recipient no 
benefits; that person will not be able to apprehend the work.23  Thus, access controls 
underpin the reproduction, communication and distribution rights.    
                                                 
20See WCT art. 6 and accompanying Agreed Statement.   
21See id. art. 8 (“authors of literary or artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any 
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to 
the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access those works from a place 
and at a time individually chosen by them.”  Emphasis supplied.).   
22Article 6 of the 2001 European Union Information Society Directive, however, implements WCT art. 11 
by protecting access controls. 
23 See Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2003] FCAFC 157 (30 July 2003).   In 
an action under section 116A of the Australian copyright act, which gives copyright owners a right of 
action against sellers of devices whose purpose is to circumvent technological protection measures, the 
court construed “technological protection measure” to include controls that block access to unauthorized 
copies because the controls “prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright in a work.”  A technological 
measure that “renders the infringing copies . . . useless,” meets the statutory requirement of preventing 
infringement “by rendering the sale of the copy ‘impracticable or impossible by anticipatory action.’” 
This decision also exemplifies the uncertainty regarding the relationship of RAM copying to the 
reproduction right; two of three judges held that temporary storage in RAM did not produce a copy “in 
material form,” and therefore no reproduction within the meaning of the Act had occurred. 
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Acts prohibited -- “the circumvention”:  The WCT text appears most directly to cover 
the acts of removing, breaking or bypassing a technological measure.  But relatively few 
individual users are likely to be able to engage in these acts unaided by a device that will 
overcome the protection.  The question therefore arises whether the formulation “the 
circumvention” covers only that act, or also reaches the more economically significant 
activity of “preparatory acts,” including supplying a device that will enable the 
circumvention.  The earlier version of art. 11 set out in the Basic Proposal24 specifically 
targeted circumvention devices; should one infer from the final version’s more abstract 
expression a rejection of the liability of manufacturers and distributors of devices? 25   
 
Such an inference seems unwarranted, because it would significantly diminish the 
effectiveness of the prohibition.  First, limiting the prohibition to the act of circumvention 
would mean that copyright owners would need to discover and prove the commission of 
acts that may often occur in private, at the user’s home.  This seems both difficult for 
copyright owners and undesirable to users.26  Second, outlawing the device as well as the 
activity is likely to have a greater impact on the provision of circumvention devices; 
without the device, less circumvention is likely to occur, and it is more effective to 
pursue a small number of device suppliers than the large numbers of their customers.27  
Moreover, the formulation “the circumvention” should be read in the context of the 
sentence in which it appears.  An interpretation that disfavors effective protection against 
circumvention by limiting the prohibited conduct to the sole act of circumvention, rather 
than encompassing the provision of devices as well, would be inconsistent with art. 11’s 
direction that member States “shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal 
remedies against the circumvention . . .”28
 
Acts prohibited – circumvention of technological measures “that restrict acts, 
in respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or 
permitted by law”:  Not all acts of circumvention are violations of article 11; member 
States incur no obligation to prohibit circumventions that allow the user to exploit a 
public domain work, or to engage in an act authorized by the right holder, or, more 
importantly, that allow the user to engage in a non infringing act, such as accessing a 
work in the public domain, or copying for purposes endorsed by articles 10 and 10bis.  
Article 11 delegates to member States’ laws the determination of permissible acts, but 
                                                 
24 Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, in 1996 Records 
at 217, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/4. 
25 See, e.g., Thomas C. Vijne, Copyright Imperilled? 21 EIPR 192, 201 (1999); Alain Strowel and Séverine 
Dusollier, Legal Protection of Technological Systems, Workshop on Implementation Issues of the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), Geneva, 
December 6-7, 1999, WIPO Doc. WCT-WPPT/IMP/2 at 7, available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/1999/wct_wppt/pdf/imp99_2.pdf.  Contra, Kamiel Koelman, 
A Hard Nut to Crack: The Protection of Technological Measures, 22 EIPR 272, 273 (2000) (whether WCT 
art. 11 requires member States to prohibit the act of circumvention is “debatable”).  
26 See, e.g., Marks & Turnbull, supra, at 6 (pointing out privacy and practical concerns underlying the 
monitoring of private activity that a prohibition limited to the act of circumvention would entail).  
27 Accord, Reinbothe & von Lewinski, supra, at 144. 
28 Accord, id., at 145; Ficsor, supra, at 549. 
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these must remain consonant with the scope of exceptions and limitations allowed under 
WCT art. 10 and Berne Conv. arts. 9(2), 10, 10bis, 11bis and 13.  
 
The difficulty in implementing WCT article 11 arises with respect to the 
prohibition of circumvention devices and services.  These may be used to engage in acts 
that infringe, but they may also be used for permitted purposes.  If the prohibition sweeps 
too broadly, it may bar the manufacture and dissemination of devices or services that 
have legitimate uses other than to circumvent controls on access to copyrighted works.  
Too extensive a prohibition may frustrate whatever legitimate activities the devices may 
permit.  Equally importantly, too broad a prohibition may hamper the development of 
useful new technologies.  On the other hand, if national law provided that a device may 
be distributed so long as it is capable of being put to use for non infringing purposes, the 
prohibition would likely become meaningless.  This in turn would put the national law in 
tension with article 11, for that law’s protection of the technological measure would be 
neither “adequate” nor “effective.”   
 
For example, an access-circumvention device may be used to decrypt public 
domain motion pictures, but the same device can be employed to decrypt works still 
under copyright.  A device that circumvents copy controls may be used to copy limited 
portions for purposes of illustration for teaching, but it may also be used to make 
unlimited complete copies to distribute to one’s friends (or to the world over the Internet) 
for purposes of personal enjoyment.  In most instances, and especially for mass-market 
devices, the maker or provider of the device will not know, at the time the device is made 
available, the nature of the use to which it will be put (although he or she might well 
anticipate that the market for the device is not likely to be limited to researchers, teachers 
and librarians).29  Even if the device is designed in good faith to allow the public to 
decrypt DVDs of “The Sheik” or “Birth of a Nation” or other silent-era motion pictures 
in the public domain, it is equally capable, and probably more likely, to be used to unlock 
the digitized oeuvre of Federico Fellini or Woody Allen. 
 
The Basic Proposal sought to address the problem of intended purpose or likely 
utilization by defining the prohibited device as one whose “primary purpose or effect” 
was to circumvent.  This drew considerable opposition, however, notably from 
delegations who urged a “sole purpose or effect” standard.30  The final version of article 
11 avoids that controversy by declining to define targeted devices (indeed, not 
mentioning devices at all), and leaving it to member States to determine how to protect 
against “the circumvention . . .”  As the analysis above suggests, however, the “adequate 
and effective” proviso would seem to require member States to bar the general circulation 
                                                 
29 The context of the production or provision of the device may be determinative in certain circumstances.  
For example, if a university’s information technology department supplies a circumvention device to 
university teaching or library staff for purposes of research or preservation, the uses of the device will 
likely be limited to those “permitted by law,” and the provision of the device should therefore be 
permissible as well.  Problems would arise, however, were the same device distributed to the general 
public, because the activities of the recipients of the device would no longer be likely to be confined to non 
infringing acts.    
30 See 1996 Records at 711-14; proposed amendment to substitute “sole intended purpose” for “primary 
purpose or effect” (submitted by Singapore), WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/12 at 1996 Records 712, para. 526. 
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of circumvention devices.  For the same reason, it also appears to disallow a “sole 
intended purpose” standard.  While that standard might have proved too coarse a sieve, 
the opposite risk remains, that, in the absence of treaty guidance on the preservation of 
non infringing uses, national implementing laws will design so fine a mesh that too few 
non infringing applications will succeed in passing through.  The challenge for national 
laws, then, is to determine how to regulate the creation and dissemination of 
circumvention devices without effectively cutting off the fair uses that at least some 
devices, in the right hands, would permit.   
 
“Effective legal remedies”:  WCT Article 11 does not instruct member States regarding 
the nature of the sanction for violating the anti circumvention norm.   Thus, the WCT 
does not specify whether member States must grant injunctive relief against the 
distribution of circumvention devices or offering of circumvention services.  In many 
cases, that relief may be necessary to insure “adequate and effective” protection, but there 
may be situations in which a lesser course, such as permitting the distribution of the 
device, subject to remunerating right owners, might be envisioned.   As a general matter, 
the TRIPs provisions on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, arts. 41-61, 
indicate the range of remedies that constitute effective relief.  It is worth noting that the 
WCT does not require that protections for technological measures be enacted as part of 
national copyright laws; that certainly is one route, but so too are sui generis laws, or 
inclusion of protections within the scope of more general laws, such as those addressing 
unfair competition.31
 
One matter, discussed in connection with the Basic Proposal, was whether 
member States should be obliged to impose design mandates on consumer equipment, so 
that mass market playback devices would interact successfully with technological 
protection measures applied to the content of the works played back.  Mandates of this 
sort had been posited and debated as early as the WIPO Draft Model Law of 1990.32  But 
those debates occurred in the context of discussions over mandated protection measures, 
such as the Serial Copy Management System ultimately required for digital audio tape 
players by the 1992 US Audio Home Recording Act.33  Once the drafters determined to 
leave the design of protection measures to the member States, design mandates were no 
longer at issue at the international level.  Member States remain free to impose such 
requirements as a means of domestic implementation of the anti circumvention norm, but 
they have no duty to do so.  The trend, in fact, is the other way: both the US and the EU 
have explicitly dispensed the designers of playback or other devices from having to 
                                                 
31 For example, Japan has divided coverage of technological measures between the copyright law and the 
unfair competition law.  See Copyright Law (Law No.48, promulgated on May 6, 1970, as amended 
through June 12, 1988) Article 120bis(i); Unfair Competition Prevention Law (No. 47 of May 19, 1993, as 
last amended on April 23, 1999) – art. 2(x)-(xi), discussed in Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws, supra, at 
431-36.  Australia has done this solely within the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 (ss 116A and D) but 
makes them the subject of separate rights of action that may be brought by the copyright owner. 
32 See Memorandum prepared for the Committee of Experts on a Draft Model Law, 1990 Copyright 279-
80, para, 312-18;  Report, id. at 299-300, para. 159-67. 
33 See id. at 279, para 309-10 (Memorandum); 300 para. 164 (Report); 17 USC sec. 1002. 
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comply with the specifications of the protection measure, so long as they do not 
circumvent it.34  Non cooperation is fully permissible; aggressive hostilities are not.  
 
 We have considered the policy underlying WCT article 11; does the WCT 
successfully implement that policy?  If the goal was to promote the digital distribution of 
works of authorship by giving authors some sense of security that copy or access-
protected formats will not be vulnerable to piracy, it remains to be seen how effective 
national implementations of article 11 prove to be in preventing or forestalling 
circumvention35 activities or devices.  If the companion goal was to ensure that privileged 
unauthorized uses could continue to be made notwithstanding authors’ resort to 
technological protections, it remains to be seen whether the various member State 
attempts to reconcile meaningful protection with preservation of copyright exceptions 
and limitations achieve a successful balance.  With that caution in mind, we turn to the 
US experience in implementing the mandates of the WIPO Treaties.    
 
II. The U.S. Experience with legal protection of technological protections of works 
of authorship 
 
The following discussion will examine the text of Section 1201 of the 1976 Copyright 
Act and its judicial and administrative interpretation.36  The text defines three new 
                                                 
34 See 17 USC sec 1201(c)(“no mandate” clause); Information Society Directive, supra note 24, Recital 48. 
35 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. sec. 1201(d)-(j); Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society, art. 6(4), para. 43, Official Journal L 167, 22/06/2001. 
36 Section 1201 provides, in relevant part: 
§ 1201. Circumvention of copyright protection systems
 (a) Violations Regarding Circumvention of Technological Measures.  
(1)(A) No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work 
protected under this title. The prohibition contained in the preceding sentence shall take effect at the 
end of the 2–year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this chapter. . . . 
 (2) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any 
technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that—
 (A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title;
 (B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; or
 (C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that person's 
knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a 
work protected under this title.
 (3) As used in this subsection—
 (A) to "circumvent a technological measure" means to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an 
encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological 
measure, without the authority of the copyright owner; and
 (B) a technological measure "effectively controls access to a work" if the measure, in the ordinary 
course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the 
authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work. 
 (b) Additional Violations. (1) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or 
otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that— 
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violations: (a)(1) to circumvent technological protection measures that control access to 
copyrighted works; (a)(2) to manufacture, disseminate or offer, etc. devices or services, 
etc. that circumvent access controls; and (b) to manufacture, disseminate, or offer, etc. 
devices or services etc. that circumvent a technological measure that "effectively protects 
a right of the copyright owner . . . ." It is important to appreciate that these violations are 
distinct from copyright infringement. The violation occurs with the prohibited acts; it is 
not necessary to prove that the dissemination of circumvention devices resulted in 
specific infringements, or that the purpose of circumventing an access control was to 
commit an infringing act.  On the other hand, section 1201 also sets out a long, disparate 
(and somewhat incoherent) list of exceptions to the prohibition on circumvention of 
access controls.37  Section 1201 thus appears to expand the scope of copyright in the 
following ways:  
1. It creates a claim for unauthorized access to works of authorship; 
2. It makes distributors of circumvention devices directly liable for the dissemination 
of the means to gain unauthorized access;  
3.  It makes distributors of circumvention devices directly liable for the dissemination 
of the means to make copies or to engage in communications to the public;  
4. It makes disseminators of both kinds of devices liable even if some of the end users 
to whom the devices are distributed would employ the devices for non infringing 
purposes.  
 
 To appreciate the actual scope of section 1201, it is necessary to inquire further 
into the subject matter of its protection, into the acts it prohibits, and into its 
accommodation of copyright exceptions.  That inquiry will allow us better to assess 
whether section 1201, at least as experienced so far, has over-expanded the reach of 
copyright, or, rather, has enabled copyright to adapt to the challenges and opportunities 
that digital media present. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 (A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection afforded by a 
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work 
or a portion thereof; 
 
 (B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent protection 
afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this 
title in a work or a portion thereof; or 
 (C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that person's 
knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively 
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof. 
 (2) As used in this subsection—
 (A) to "circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure" means avoiding, bypassing, 
removing, deactivating, or otherwise impairing a technological measure; and 
(B) a technological measure "effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title" if the 
measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits the exercise of 
a right of a copyright owner under this title. 
For a discussion of the legislative history of Section 1201, and of proposals that preceded it, see Besek, 
Anti-Circumvention Laws at 400-07 (2004). 
37 See 17 USC sec. 1201(d)-(j). 
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Subject matter protected:   We have seen that section 1201 covers two different kinds 
of protective measures, those that “effectively control access to a work protected under 
this title [the Copyright Act],” and those that “effectively protect a right of a copyright 
owner,” i.e., that protect against copying and communicating to the public.  Judicial 
decisions construing section 1201 have considered what it means to protect “effectively.”  
They also have addressed whether the object of the access control measure is a “work 
protected under this title.” 
 
“Effectively protect:” With respect to the first issue, the courts are unanimous that 
“effective” protection does not mean protection that is especially difficult to crack.38  For 
example, employing the door-and-key metaphor that judges addressing access issues 
seem to favor,39 the court in 321 Studios v. MGM, a case involving the sale of devices 
designed to permit “backup copying” of protected DVDs, quipped that the claim that the 
DVD protection code is not “effective” “is equivalent to a claim that, since it is easy to 
find skeleton keys on the black market, a deadbolt is not an effective lock to a door.”  The 
door metaphor reappeared in a more serious challenge to the effectiveness of a “lockout 
code”’s protection in Lexmark v. Static Controls Corp., a decision concerning the 
circumvention of a code controlling access to the functions of a printer.  In that case, the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that the printer engine program was accessible 
by other means.  
 
The authentication sequence, it is true, may well block 
one form of "access" -- the "ability to . . . make use of" the 
Printer Engine Program by preventing the printer from 
functioning. But it does not block another relevant form of 
"access" -- the "ability to [] obtain" a copy of the work or to 
"make use of" the literal elements of the program (its code). 
Because the statute refers to "controlling access to a work 
protected under this title," it does not naturally apply when 
the "work protected under this title" is otherwise accessible. 
Just as one would not say that a lock on the back door of a 
house "controls access" to a house whose front door does 
not contain a lock . . . it does not make sense to say that this 
provision of the DMCA applies to otherwise-readily-
accessible copyrighted works. Add to this the fact that the 
DMCA not only requires the technological measure to 
"control[] access" but also requires the measure to control 
that access "effectively," and it seems clear that this 
provision does not naturally extend to a technological 
                                                 
38 321 Studios v. MGM, 307 F.Supp. 2d 1085, 1095 (ND Cal. 2004).  See also Universal Studios v. 
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346, 317-18 (SDNY 2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001)  (rejecting as “spurious” the claim that DVD protection code did not 
“effectively” protect DVDs because a Norwegian teenager easily cracked it).  
39 See also Pearl Indus. v. Standard I/O, 275 F.Supp.2d 326, 350 (D. Me. 2003) (describing plaintiff’s 
access control measure as “the ‘electronic equivalent’ of a locked door”). 
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measure that restricts one form of access but leaves another 
route wide open.40
 
The significance of the court’s interpretation depends on how many works will come 
within the two elements of the described universe: 1. works whose use depends on 
interaction with a computer program that will function only on verification of an 
authentication sequence; 2. the code of that computer program can be seen or copied 
without going through the authentication process.41  
 
Controlling access to a work of authorship:  The Lexmark case is most significant for 
its analysis of the second issue -- whether the technological measure controls access to a 
work protected under the Copyright Act.  In notorious, but happily short-lived, attempts 
to leverage the DMCA into protecting the “aftermarket” for spare and replacement parts, 
the producers of printers and cartridges, in one case, and of garage door openers in the 
other,42 asserted that rival printer cartridge and door opener manufacturers had violated 
the DMCA’s prohibition on circumvention of access controls.  In both cases, the spare 
part in question would not interact with the host device unless the host device recognized 
the spare part as authorized to function together with the host device.  If the spare part 
entered the appropriate authentication sequence, or in the terms of another frequently-
used metaphor, engaged in the “secret handshake” with the host device, then the host 
would be “fooled” into “thinking” that it was working with a component made by the 
same producer, and would allow the component to perform its intended function.  The 
“secret handshake” thus made it possible for a rival printer cartridge to substitute for the 
printer producer’s own replacement cartridges, and for a “universal garage door opener” 
to open the remote controlled garage doors installed by a rival company. 
 
 The question that should leap to mind is: “What have printer cartridges and 
garage doors to do with copyright?”  Nothing, except, emphasized the plaintiffs, that 
computer programs control the functioning of these devices, and computer programs are 
copyrighted works.  The dazzling (or mind-boggling) consequence of plaintiffs’ 
reasoning: any object whose workings are controlled by computer programs  -- and today, 
that means an endless variety of consumer and industrial goods – can come within the 
scope of section 1201 if the object’s producer makes access to those programs subject to 
an authentication sequence.  As a policy matter, this is inconceivable.  Among other 
things, Congress has persistently declined to legislate design protection, in part because 
                                                 
40 387 F.3d 522, 547 (6th Cir. 2004).  The court also stated “one would not say that a lock on any door of a 
house ‘controls access’ to the house after its purchaser receives the key to the lock”; this proposition is 
questionable: the lock continues to control access to those who do not have keys. 
41 There is a more radical, but less plausible, understanding of the court’s characterization of otherwise 
accessible: as discussed earlier, the “work” is an incorporeal object, thus, a work distributed in digital 
copies which are access-protected, and in traditional hard copies which are not access-protected, is 
“otherwise accessible” without circumventing the digital copies, because recourse may be had to the hard 
copies.  This would mean that section 1201(a) would apply only to technological protections of works 
made available only in digital protected copies.  It seems unlikely that Congress, in seeking to encourage 
digital dissemination of works, also sought to discourage dissemination of the same works in traditional 
non protected formats.  Indeed, such a construction could lead to the “digital lockup” that many critics of 
the DMCA have feared. 
42 See Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Technologies, 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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of its inability to resolve the spare parts issue;43 it would be extraordinary if it achieved 
the result of an exceptionally strong design protection regime through the stealthy means 
of the DMCA. 
 
 But does the text of section 1201 permit this result?  The computer program that 
controls the functioning of the consumer product may indeed be a copyrighted work.  The 
Lexmark court held that the authentication sequence was insufficiently original to be 
protectable, but the printer program was copyrightable.  Nonetheless, that was not 
sufficient to bring the access control within the scope of section 1201.  In a common 
sense interpretation of the text, the court reviewed earlier “secret handshake” cases, 
involving access to transmissions of recordings of musical works, to videogames, and to 
motion pictures on DVDs.  The court underscored that all involved circumvention of 
access to computer programs that were “conduit[s] to protectable expression.”44  In the 
printer cartridge case, by contrast, invocation of the computer program was clearly 
pretextual: operating the program did not make it possible to see, hear, or otherwise 
engage with a work of authorship.  Rather, “the program’s output is purely functional: [it] 
‘controls a number of operations’ in the Lexmark printer.”45
 
Nature of the access that the measure controls: The court in the garage door opener 
case reached the same result, but for different reasons.  Where the Lexmark court focused 
on the “work” that is the object of the access control, the Chamberlain court addressed 
the purpose of the access that the technological measure controls.  The court interpolated 
into section 1201 a requirement that the protection against circumvention of an access 
control be related to protection against infringement.  To the extent that access controls 
forestall infringement, for example, by making unauthorized copies unplayable, and 
therefore futile, the access control comes within the scope of section 1201.  But, if the 
uses that the access control cuts off are not infringing uses, then the access control is not 
one that section 1201 was designed to protect, the court determined.46  In the case of 
garage door openers, this makes some sense: using the opener does not infringe any 
copyrights.  But, as applied to access controls that are “conduits” to works of authorship, 
the proposition is in some tension with Congress’ goals in prohibiting the circumvention 
of those technological measures.  The Chamberlain court worried that interpreting 
section 1201 to create an independent violation for circumventing access controls (or 
disseminating access circumvention devices) would “effectively create two distinct 
copyright regimes,” one tied to the traditional rights of copyright owners (section 
1201(b)), and the other allowing copyright owners “unlimited rights to hold 
circumventors liable under § 1201(a) merely for accessing that work, even if that access 
enabled only rights that the Copyright Act grants to the public.”47
  
 But there is considerable evidence from the text and from the legislative history 
                                                 
43 The closest Congress has come so far is Chapter 13 of title 17, which sets out a sui generis regime 
limited to the protection of boat hull designs. 
44 387 F.3d at 547-48. 
45 Id at 548. 
46 Chamberlain v Skylink, 381 F.3d at 1197-1201. 
47 Id. at 1200-01. 
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that Congress did intend to create an additional copyright regime, based on the control 
over access to digitally distributed works of authorship.  The text indicates that the 
“access” that section 1201(a) protects goes beyond traditional copyright prerogatives; it 
distinguishes “access” from a “right of the copyright owner under this title.”   Some 
activities subject to access controls do not implicate traditional copyright owner rights 
such as reproduction and public performance.  For example, an access control may limit 
the number of viewings of a motion picture distributed on a DVD.  But if the viewings 
occur at home, they likely do not come within the traditional scope of exclusive rights.  
Thus, suppose I purchase a time-loaded or limited-viewing DVD, for a lower price than 
an unlimited viewing DVD, and that I circumvent an access protection in order to obtain 
unlimited number of private viewings of the film for an unlimited time. I have not 
committed copyright infringement, because the public performance right does not reach 
the extra viewings.  I have, however, defeated the purpose of offering the film on a pay-
per-view or similar basis.   The legislative history indicates that the DMCA was designed 
in part specifically to foster a variety of business models offering the public a diversity of 
levels of access, for a diversity of prices.  As the House Commerce Committee reported: 
 
[A]n increasing number of intellectual property works are 
being distributed using a “client-server” model, where the 
work is effectively “borrowed” by the user (e.g., infrequent 
users of expensive software purchase a certain number of 
uses, or viewers watch a movie on a pay-per-view basis).  
To operate in this new environment, content providers will 
need both the technology to make new uses possible and 
the legal framework to ensure they can protect their work 
from piracy.48
 
“In other words,” my Columbia colleague June Besek has explained, “providing 
copyright owners with the ability to preclude unlimited access was a goal of the DMCA, 
not just an unforeseen and unfortunate consequence.”49  This appears to be true, even 
when some of the precluded access would not result in copyright infringement. 
 
Acts prohibited:  Section 1201 prohibits the act of circumventing an access control, and 
the “trafficking” in devices that circumvent either access controls or “rights” controls.  It 
does not prohibit the act of circumventing a rights control, in part because the results of 
that act will be directly infringing (or will qualify for an exception), and in part because 
the most economically significant act is the distribution of the device that will allow the 
end-user to circumvent.  By contrast, circumvention of an access control does not directly 
result in an infringement.  If circumvention of an access control is not unlawful, then, 
arguably, dissemination of a device that enables circumvention of an access control 
would not be wrongful either.   By making the act of access circumvention unlawful, the 
DMCA lay a stronger foundation for prohibiting the dissemination of enabling devices as 
well.   
 
                                                 
48.H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (1998). 
49 Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws, supra, at 474. 
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Circumvention: While most of the cases involve circumvention devices, a few cases 
have arisen concerning the act of circumvention.50  One of these put in issue the meaning 
of “to circumvent.”  In IMS Inquiry Mgmt. Sys. v. Berkshire Info. Mgmt. Sys.,51 
Berkshire accessed IMS’s database by using a password apparently obtained from one of 
the IMS’s customers.  Berkshire defended against the section 1201(a) claim on the 
ground that it did not break down the door of IMS’ database; it used an actual key.  The 
court agreed: “Defendant did not surmount or puncture or evade any technological 
measure to [gain access]; instead, it used a password intentionally issued by plaintiff to 
another entity.”52  This interpretation is questionable.  Section 1201(a)(3)(A) defines “to 
circumvent” as “to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or 
otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without 
the authority of the copyright owner” (emphasis supplied).  Entry of the password 
“deactivates” the measure that restricts access;53 if the password is employed by an 
unauthorized user, then the deactivation will not have occurred with the copyright owner’s 
authority.54
Devices: Section 1201(a)(2) and (b) do not prohibit the dissemination of every device 
that might be used to defeat an access or rights control. These provisions do not target 
general purpose devices whose accidental, incidental or unwitting use results in 
circumvention. Nor does it bar those devices that, while capable of, and even used for, 
circumvention, are primarily designed or used for other purposes. The law prohibits the 
manufacture and trafficking in devices and services in the following three circumstances: 
  
1. The device was "primarily designed or produced for the purpose of 
circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access" to a 
copyrighted work or “effectively protects a right of the copyright owner”; or 
  
2. The device albeit not primarily designed to circumvent, in fact "has only 
limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent . . 
."; or 
  
3. The device is "marketed" (i.e., advertised or promoted) as a device to be used to 
circumvent access or rights controls. In this case, the target of the law is the person 
                                                 
50 In one case, the plaintiff brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the section 1201(a)(1) 
was unconstitutional because it restrained his First Amendment right to reverse engineer software that 
blocked access to certain Internet sites, in order to publish a list of the blocked sites.  The court held the 
complaint too vague to give rise to an adjudicable “case or controversy.”  See Edelman v. N2H2, 263 
F.Supp.2d 137 (D. Ma. 2003).  In any event, it is likely plaintiff’s conduct would have benefited from 
statutory and administrative exceptions to sec. 1201(a).  See Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws at  414-15.  
51 307 F.Supp.2d 521 (SDNY 2003). 
52 Id at 533. 
53 A password-controlled access measure fits the statutory definition of a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a work, see 17 USC sec. 1201(a)(3)(B). 
54 See, e.g., 321 Studios v. MGM, 307 F.Supp. 2d 1085, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“321 states that its 
software does not avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or otherwise impair a technological measure, but that 
it simply uses the authorized key to unlock the encryption. However, while 321's software does use the 
authorized key to access the DVD, it does not have authority to use this key, as licensed DVD players do, 
and it therefore avoids and bypasses [the] CSS [access control].”). 
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promoting the circumventing use; it is not the manufacturer or distributor of the 
device, unless that person acts in concert with the marketer. 
 
 Many of the cases that have arisen have involved rather obvious circumvention 
devices, such as cable and satellite descramblers,55 and devices designed to neutralize the 
access controls on DVDs.56  As a result, they have not required courts to determine 
whether the primary purpose or actual use of the device was to circumvent.57  Courts 
have interpreted the text of section 1201 to reach trafficking in circumvention devices 
regardless of whether the circumventions that the devices enable would result in 
infringements.  Thus, for example, in one of the DVD cases, 321 Studios v. MGM, the 
court stated: 
 
a simple reading of the statute makes it clear that its 
prohibition applies to the manufacturing, trafficking in and 
making of devices that would circumvent encryption 
technology, not to the users of such technology. It is the 
technology itself at issue, not the uses to which the 
copyrighted material may be put. This Court finds . . . that 
legal downstream use of the copyrighted material by 
customers is not a defense to the software manufacturer's 
violation of the provisions of §  1201(b)(1).58
 
In most of the cases, nonetheless, the relationship between the circumvention that 
the device enabled and infringement was fairly apparent.  For example, in one of the first 
cases decided under sec. 1201, RealNetworks v. Streambox,59 the defendant’s device 
imitated the “secret handshake” giving access to recorded music transmitted from the 
RealNetworks server.  Unlike a Real Player, through which a customer could listen to the 
transmissions, but not copy them, the defendant’s system ignored the Real server’s “copy 
switch,” enabling its customers to make unauthorized copies of the recorded music.  In 
321 Studios v. MGM, the access circumvention device allegedly allowed users to make 
playable “backup copies” of DVDs that they had purchased, but there is no general 
copyright exception permitting the creation of “backup copies.”60  Moreover, 
protestations that the device simply facilitated lawful uses lost credibility in light of 321’s 
“spam” promotion of the device under the slogan “Never buy another DVD again!”61  
                                                 
55 See, e.g., DirecTV v. Borrow, 2005 US Dist LEXIS 1328 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Comcast of Ill. v. Hightech 
Electronics, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 14619 (N.D. Ill. 2004); DirectTV v. Ferguson, 328 F.Supp2d 904 (N.D. 
Ind. 2004).  
56 See, e.g., Universal Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); 321 Studios v. MGM, 307 F.Supp. 
2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
57 An exception is DirecTV v. Little, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 16350 (N.D. Cal. 2004) in which the court 
determined that there was a factual dispute concerning whether the defendant’s “smart cards” were 
“primarily designed for signal theft.” 
58 307 F.Supp. at 1097-98, citing Universal Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001) and US v. 
Elcom, 203 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1120 (ND Cal. 2002). 
59 No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000). 
60 17 USC sec. 117 permits archival copying of computer programs, but not every work expressed in 1s and 
0s is a “computer program.”  See generally US v. Elcom, supra, at 1135. 
61 A copy of the “spam” was forwarded to me three years ago, with the inquiry, “Can they do that?” 
 18
Similarly, although the US distributors of the Norwegian-authored “De-CSS” DVD 
access-circumvention program claimed the program could be used in a Linux-based DVD 
player, the program was not distributed in the US as a component of such a player;62 
rather it was made available as a free-standing program which could be used to neutralize 
the access protection on unauthorized copies of DVDs run on Windows players.  It 
doubtless did not assist defendants’ cause to have published the code in an online 
magazine called 2600.com, the Hacker Quarterly.  As the district court observed with 
some relish, “The Hacker Quarterly has included articles on such topics as how to steal 
an Internet domain name, access other people's e-mail, intercept cellular phone calls, and 
break into the computer systems at Costco stores and Federal Express.”63
 
A more debatable condemnation of an access-circumvention device occurred in 
another early case, Sony Computer Ent. v. Gamemasters.64  Defendants sold a “Game 
Enhancer” device that allowed users to alter the real-time play of a videogame (without 
preserving the modifications), and that also allowed users to override Sony’s “region 
coding,” so that a game purchased in a differently-coded region, such as Europe or Japan, 
could nonetheless be played on a US PlayStation console.  Sony also claimed that the 
device that overrode the region-coding also made it possible to play counterfeit copies of 
PlayStation games, but little evidence supported this contention. The court granted a 
preliminary injunction on the ground that defendant’s device neutralized an access 
control; the court did not inquire into whether a game lawfully acquired in one region 
could be played in another without infringing copyright.  Both the “first sale” (or 
“exhaustion”) doctrine,65 and the confinement of the performance right to public 
performances, however, suggest that the copyright owner’s exclusive rights do not extend 
to determining the geographical zones in which members of the public may privately 
view copies lawfully made.  Applying section 1201(a) to protect against circumvention of 
access measures that limit those copies to playback devices licensed for a given territory 
thus results in a scope of protection not otherwise available under the copyright act.  
  
 But if region-coding is obnoxious, cannot much the same objection be made 
regarding access measures that control pay per view and similar schemes based on price 
discrimination?  The answer may turn on the existence of evidence that Congress sought 
to protect the latter business models, while similar evidence does not appear to exist 
regarding the former.  Moreover, the latter business models are built on a quid-pro-quo: 
the extent of access allowed turns on the price the consumer pays.  Price discrimination 
does not appear to characterize region-coding; the consumer is not offered world-wide 
access at one price, and geographically restricted access at a different, lower, price.  
These responses do not, however, contradict the basic observation that, by protecting 
against the circumvention of access controls, without further requiring proof of a nexus 
between the circumvention and infringement, Congress has permitted, indeed 
encouraged, copyright owners to create and control markets for their works that the 
traditional exclusive rights under copyright would not secure.  Whether this is a good 
                                                 
62 This might have been permissible under section 1201(f). 
63 Universal Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294, 308-09 (SDNY 2000) (citations omitted). 
64 87 F.Supp.2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
65 See 17 USC sec. 109(a). 
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thing or a bad thing may depend on whether, overall, more works become available to 
more consumers, under a greater variety of terms, conditions, and prices, than were 
available without legally protected technological protection measures.   
 
Accommodation of copyright exceptions:  Even so, there is another trade-off to 
consider.  Is this flourishing of new owner-controlled copyright markets compatible with 
the various exceptions that limit the reach of copyright law in a variety of circumstances?  
Do we get more works for less money, but less freedom to quote from, teach from, build 
on, study, criticize and even ridicule them?  To assess the impact on copyright exceptions 
of legal protection for technological protection measures, we have first to distinguish 
section 1201’s treatment of circumvention of rights controls from that of access controls.  
With respect to access controls, section 1201 reaches both the end-users who directly 
circumvent those controls, and the persons who manufacture, distribute and market 
devices primarily designed or used to circumvent those controls. On the other hand, 
section 1201 includes several exceptions to these prohibitions.  As construed by the 
courts, do these adequately accommodate desirable, albeit unauthorized, uses of 
copyrighted works?  
 
With respect to rights controls, section 1201 does not reach end users who directly 
circumvent rights controls, or who employ devices to effect the circumvention.  Thus an 
end-user who circumvents a copy control, and then makes a copy or communication 
permissible under the fair use doctrine or other applicable exception, is liable neither for 
a circumvention violation, nor for copyright infringement.  An end-user who circumvents 
a copy control to make an unexcused copy or communication to the public will not be 
liable for a circumvention violation, but will be liable for copyright infringement.  On the 
other hand, the prohibition on trafficking in rights control circumvention devices may 
make it difficult for many end-users to obtain and utilize the devices regardless of the 
purpose to which they would put them.  Does the prohibition on distribution of devices 
primarily designed or used to circumvent rights controls therefore stifle copyright 
exceptions, and the beneficial uses those exceptions foster?  
 
Exceptions to circumvention of access controls:  The DMCA provides a variety of 
exceptions, including for reverse engineering, encryption research, and security testing.66  
Two decisions have construed the scope of the section 1201(f) exception for reverse 
engineering.67  Both have found the exception inapplicable on the ground that the 
                                                 
66 For a fuller description of these, and the other, exceptions to 1201(a), see, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, 
Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium,” 23 Colum.-VLA J. L. & the Arts 137, 148-52 (1999). 
67 Section 1201(f) provides: 
(f) Reverse Engineering.  
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), a person who has lawfully obtained the 
right to use a copy of a computer program may circumvent a technological measure that effectively 
controls access to a particular portion of that program for the sole purpose of identifying and 
analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to achieve interoperability of an 
independently created computer program with other programs, and that have not previously been 
readily available to the person engaging in the circumvention, to the extent any such acts of 
identification and analysis do not constitute infringement under this title. 
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defendants had not circumvented access controls for the sole purpose of creating non 
infringing interoperable programs.  Rather, the defendants, having gained access by 
reverse engineering the plaintiff’s control program, made infringing copies of the 
plaintiff’s work.  In Storage Technology Corp. v. Custom Hardware Engineering & 
Consulting,68 the court held that while the defendant reverse engineered plaintiff’s library 
maintenance program in order to break the access code, the defendant then simply copied 
the entirety of plaintiff’s program.  
 
In Davidson & Assoc. v. Internet Gateway,69 the defendants broke the access code 
of the Battle.net online videogame service, in order to develop a Battle.net “emulation 
site” that would allow owners of copies of the Blizzard videogame to play their games 
online, without the advertisements and use restrictions imposed by the Battle.net site.  
Battle.net required users to enter an authentication sequence that would permit the 
website to verify that the user’s copy of the game was authorized.  Thus, Battle.net 
screened out unauthorized copies, and did not allow them access to the game site.  
Defendants’ “bnetd” alternative site did not require users to enter the authentication 
sequence; as a result, owners of “counterfeit” copies could join in a multiplayer game 
environment that replicated the desirable aspects of the Battle.net experience.  The court 
held that the output of the “bnetd” program infringed that of the Battle.net program 
because there were “no differences between Battle.net and the bnetd emulator from the 
standpoint of a user who is actually playing the game.”70   
 
It is not entirely clear that the defendant’s use in that case in fact exceeded the 
scope of the reverse engineering exception.  Assuming the defendant had lawfully 
obtained a copy of the Blizzard and/or Battlenet programs, it appears to have accessed the 
program’s code “for the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the 
(Battle.net) program that are necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently 
created computer program (bnetd) with other programs (its users’ copies of Blizzard).”  
Defendant was entitled to do this “to the extent any such acts of identification and analysis 
do not constitute infringement under this title.”  The decision does not demonstrate that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a)(2) and (b), a person may develop and employ 
technological means to circumvent a technological measure, or to circumvent protection afforded by 
a technological measure, in order to enable the identification and analysis under paragraph (1), or for 
the purpose of enabling interoperability of an independently created computer program with other 
programs, if such means are necessary to achieve such interoperability, to the extent that doing so 
does not constitute infringement under this title.
 (3) The information acquired through the acts permitted under paragraph (1), and the means 
permitted under paragraph (2), may be made available to others if the person referred to in paragraph 
(1) or (2), as the case may be, provides such information or means solely for the purpose of enabling 
interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs, and to the 
extent that doing so does not constitute infringement under this title or violate applicable law other 
than this section.
 (4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "interoperability" means the ability of computer 
programs to exchange information, and of such programs mutually to use the information which has 
been exchanged.
68 2004 US Dist LEXIS 12391 (D. Mass. 2004). 
69 334 F.Supp.2d 1164 (ED Mo. 2004). 
70 Id. at 1185. 
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defendant’s analysis was infringing; rather, the results of the analysis may have produced a 
program too similar to the plaintiff’s.  On the other hand, the exception would not make 
very much sense if it did not take into account whether the program that results from 
accessing and studying the plaintiff’s code is infringing.  The caselaw developing a fair use 
exception for reverse engineering, for example, assesses whether the result of the reverse 
engineering is an independent non infringing program (similar in functionality but not 
expression).71  Moreover, the court’s decision is generally consistent with the rationale for 
protecting access controls in the first place: to render unauthorized copies useless because 
the access control will not permit the copies to be viewed or otherwise enjoyed.  In this 
case, the Battle.net authentication sequence rendered unauthorized copies of Blizzard 
relatively useless, because they would not be admitted to the online multiplayer site.  
Defendant’s bnetd site allowed those copies to be played, thus defeating the purpose of the 
access control. 
Copyright Office rulemaking:  While the exceptions to section 1201(a) are multiple, they 
are also very narrowly defined, and do not admit of expansive judicial construction.72  As a 
result, Congress instructed the Librarian of Congress, in consultation with the Register of 
Copyrights, to conduct a rulemaking every three years to identify particular classes of 
works whose users would be "adversely affected by the prohibition . . . in their ability to 
make noninfringing uses under this title" and to suspend the application of the prohibition 
on the act of access control circumvention as to those works until the next rulemaking 
period.73  Each rulemaking is de novo: a class identified in a prior rulemaking is not 
automatically reinstated; the Copyright Office must determine whether a need for an 
exemption still exists.  It is important to recognize, however, that the prohibitions against 
trafficking in access circumvention devices continue to apply.  Two rulemakings have 
now been conducted, and the following classes of works declared: 
“compilations consisting of lists of websites blocked by filtering software applications” 
(first and second rulemakings); 
“literary works, including software and databases, protected by access control 
mechanisms that fail to permit access because of malfunction, damage or obsolescence” 
(first rulemaking); 
 
“Computer programs protected by dongles that prevent access due to malfunction or 
damage and which are obsolete” (second rulemaking); 
 
“Computer programs and video games distributed in formats that have become obsolete 
and which require the original media or hardware as a condition of access” (second 
rulemaking) 
 
“Literary works distributed in e-book format when all existing e-book editions of the 
work (including digital text editions made available by authorized entities) contain access 
controls that prevent the enabling of the e-book’s read-aloud function and that prevent the 
                                                 
71 See, .e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Sony Computer Entm't, 
Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000). 
72 See 17 USC sec. 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E). 
73 For a fuller discussion, see Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws at  416-23. 
 22
enabling of screen readers to render the text into a ‘specialized format’”  (second 
rulemaking).74
 
  The characteristic most of these categories share is obsolescence or malfunction: 
the work was made available in formats no longer generally in use or which are defective, 
and circumvention is necessary to access the work.  The lists of blocked websites, or “Net 
Nanny,” exemption is different in kind, for, rather than protecting consumer interests 
regarding the ordinary use of defective or obsolete goods, it promotes free speech 
interests.  The problem arises from software filters designed, for example, to protect 
children by blocking access to websites containing sex and/or violence, hence the term 
“Net Nanny.”  Some of these filters may be over-exuberant in their coverage, and may 
screen out websites that are neither pornographic nor sadistic, but that may contain 
human anatomical references in medical or other educational contexts.  The blocking 
programs include lists of the forbidden sites, but the list is encrypted.  A third party 
seeking to determine whether a site has been wrongly targeted for exclusion cannot find 
out who is on the “black list” without decrypting the list.  The Copyright Office was 
persuaded that an exception to the access control prohibition was needed to correct this 
problem. 
 
  As may be inferred from the specificity of the exceptions resulting from the 
triennial rulemakings, these administrative proceedings do not present an opportunity to 
devise sweeping exceptions in the name of free expression, advancement of research, or 
other salutary goals.  In significant measure, this is because Congress left the Library of 
Congress and the Copyright Office rather little room to maneuver.  The EU Information 
Society Directive’s art. 12.1 instruction to the Commission to examine and report on a 
triennial basis “whether acts which are permitted by law are being adversely affected by 
the use of effective technological measures” may produce broader accommodations than 
the Copyright Office has been able to achieve in light if its far narrower statutory 
mandate.  Another reason for the parsimonious nature of the Copyright Office classes of 
exempted works nonetheless bears emphasis: the Copyright Office also rejected a variety 
of more broadly-phrased classes because those urging the broader classes failed to 
produce significant evidence that users were now, or in the next three years would likely 
be “adversely affected by the prohibition . . . in their ability to make noninfringing uses” 
of access-protected works.  The Copyright Office received many submissions detailing 
fears of “digital lockup” (as well as many submissions deploring copyright in general), 
but too little in the way of concrete demonstration that noninfringing uses were 
compromised.   
 
Other authority for broader exemptions?  The statutory scheme similarly constrains 
judicial authority to devise general exceptions to circumvention prohibitions.  The array 
of specific exceptions makes inference of a general exception inappropriate.  Moreover, 
                                                 
74 Exemption to the Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control 
Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64556, 64561 (proposed Oct. 27, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201); 
Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control 
Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011 (Oct. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
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the delegation to the Copyright Office to designate circumventable classes of works 
suggests that Congress intended administrative rather than judicial proceedings to make 
the scheme more responsive to user needs not already specified in the statute.  But, 
assuming Congress intended to foreclose judges from engrafting a general fair use type 
exception onto section 1201, may it do so, consistently with constitutional protections for 
the free speech interests that section 1201 arguably frustrates?  In the absence of fair use, 
does the first amendment require invalidating section 1201 as an undue burden on 
protected speech? 
 
  Some litigants have asserted the unconstitutionality of the US Copyright Act’s 
anticircumvention provisions.  They have contended that fair use is constitutionally 
mandated, and that section 1201 “eliminates fair use.” As a result, Congress would not 
have power to preclude fair use defenses to circumvention.  Alternatively, they have 
argued that section 1201 suppresses speech – the speech in this instance is the DVD 
access-circumvention program De-CSS – and therefore violates the first amendment.  
Every court that has so far encountered these challenges has rejected them.75  With regard 
to the first amendment, courts have observed that computer programs are a form of 
speech, but they are also functional.  To the extent the government regulates the 
software’s functional aspects, the law is “content neutral” as to the speech aspects.  The 
law will not be considered to violate the first amendment if the regulation advances a 
legitimate government interest, and is reasonably tailored to achieve that purpose.  
Congress’ interest was in promoting electronic commerce in copyrighted works, and 
Congress could legitimately seek to achieve this objective by making the distribution of 
circumvention devices unlawful.76  The fair use assertions fared no better.  First, courts 
expressed some skepticism as to whether fair use was constitutionally required.  Even 
granting that fair use plays an important, first amendment-friendly role in balancing the 
rights of copyright owners against subsequent speakers, the courts have uniformly 
spurned the “extravagant claim” that section 1201 “unconstitutionally ‘eliminates fair 
use.”77  The courts have observed that unprotected copies in non digital media remained 
available for all the usual fair use purposes, including by means of analog copying.  Even 
copying from protected media, such as DVDs, might be rendered more cumbersome, but 
it was not completely foreclosed.  The courts emphasized that “Fair use has never been 
held to be a guarantee of access to copyrighted material in order to copy it by the fair 
user's preferred technique or in the format of the original.”78  And “Defendant has cited 
no authority which guarantees a fair user the right to the most technologically convenient 
way to engage in fair use. The existing authorities have rejected that argument.”79  The 
courts’ rather abrupt treatment of the question probably reflects the contexts in which the 
cases arose, as much as the merits of a claim of entitlement to maximally convenient fair 
use.  The cases have involved entrepreneurs and intermediaries who distributed 
circumvention devices that were perceived to facilitate piracy of DVDs and e-books.  
None of these intermediaries claimed to be engaging in fair use of the circumvented 
                                                 
75 See Universal v. Corley, supra; US v. Elcom, supra; 321 Studios v. MGM, supra. 
76 See, e.g, Universal v. Corley, 273 F.3d at 453-58; Elcom, 203 F.Supp.2d at 1127-37. 
77 Corley at 458. 
78 Id at 459. 
79 US v Elcom, 203 F.Supp.2d at 1131. 
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works; nor did they show that their customers in fact sought the devices primarily in 
order to engage in non infringing uses of the playable copies of DVDs that the devices 
enabled.  Fair use in this context seemed primarily pretextual.  But the concerns about 
convenience are not frivolous: at some point, particularly if analog or unprotected 
versions cease to be readily available, “inconvenient” may look more like “impossible.”  
Should such a dismal future appear more imminent, it may well be appropriate to 
reconsider the scope of the circumvention prohibitions.  But we are a long way yet from 




  Section 1201 does represent a rebalancing of power between copyright owners and 
users.  But we should not immediately assume that any change in the prior state of affairs 
is a bad thing.  After all, which prior “balance” do we mean?  The one in which 
technology did not offer much potential for consumptive copying and copyright owners 
controlled access by controlling communications to the public?  Or the one in which 
technology enabled widespread copying, but did not afford adequate and reasonable 
means of preventing or charging for the copying?  Or the one in which technology 
permits massive copying, but also enables copyright owners to be paid for it?  Or one in 
which technology enables copyright owners to prevent or frustrate copying?  Taking the 
last pre-DMCA balance as somehow normatively compelled ignores the reality that 
copyright “balances” are highly contingent and contextual.  The more useful question is, 
regardless of past allocations of power, whether the new balance makes sense for authors, 
owners, and users.   
 
 As a recently published 3-year study conducted by Columbia Law School’s Kernochan 
Center for Law, Media and the Arts concluded: 
 
 § 1201. . .  involves genuine tradeoffs:  Congress 
made a judgment that technological protection would foster 
innovation in new content delivery mechanisms in order to 
provide consumers with a range of new options for 
experiencing copyrighted works, recognizing that 
technological controls might diminish the convenience of 
non-infringing uses.  So far, the balance that Congress 
struck appears justified.  Section 1201 has provided 
substantial benefits to consumers by encouraging the 
development of innovative new business models for 
delivering sound recordings, motion pictures, books and 
other copyrighted works to consumers.  
 
On the other hand, there is little evidence at this point 
that technological controls are preventing privileged uses.  
Flexibility in the law, the realities of the digital 
environment and market imperatives appear to be 
accommodating legitimate uses.  Most copyrighted works 
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are available for fair uses, though not necessarily in a form 
amenable to the most technologically advanced forms of 
copying, remanipulation and retransmission.  Such 
limitations, however, are at the heart of the new business 
models that are emerging in the marketplace. 
 
The reasons that DMCA critics offer for overhauling or 
replacing § 1201 are essentially the same ones presented to 
Congress in opposition to the legislation when it was under 
consideration.  Congress took them into account in crafting 
§ 1201.  Based on the track record so far, § 1201 appears to 
be performing largely as Congress had envisioned and 
should not be overhauled or replaced.  The benefits—more 
works available to consumers at a variety of price and 
convenience points—are real, and the costs have so far 
been manageable.  It is important to continue to monitor § 
1201’s effects and, where problems become apparent, 
develop specific, focused solutions.  At the present time, 
however, we should allow the new business models 
enabled by § 1201 the opportunity to continue to flourish.80
 
 I close on an optimistic note.  This analysis has addressed the occasionally 
competing concerns of copyright owners and of users.  The word “copyright owner” 
more often than not evokes a large, unloveable, multinational (or American), corporate 
entrepreneur, in short, an Evil Troll.  It is easy to deplore technological protections if one 
thinks of them only in those apocalyptic terms.  But one might instead focus on the 
opportunities technological protections extend to individual authors to disseminate their 
works, and to condition further copying or exploitation on remunerating the creators.  
Digital media, by making the means of production and dissemination available to any 
computer-equipped author, give authors a realistic opportunity to bring their works to the 
public without having to put themselves in thrall to traditional intermediaries.  The 
technological measures that reinforce legal control may enable and encourage authorial 
entrepreneurship, because authors may be able to rely on these measures to secure the 
distribution of and payment for their works, and new business models may therefore 
emerge.  Shifting control from publisher-trolls to authors not only enhances the moral 
appeal of the exercise of copyright, it also may offer the public an increased quantity and 
variety of works of authorship, as authors whom the traditional intermediary-controlled 
distribution system may have excluded now or soon may directly propose to the public 
(and be compensated for) their creations. 
    
                                                 
80 Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws, at 512-13 
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